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Faculty and Deans

Injury and the Disintegration of
Article III
Gene R. Nichol, Jr. t
The past three decades have witnessed a substantial rejection of the
private rights model of adjudication. 1 As the embrace of public law litigation has broadened, jurisdictional and procedural concepts rooted in
private rights analysis have fallen away.Z Nowhere has the pressure for
change been more direct than on the formulation of the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the United States Constitution. As a
result, after almost two hundred years, the judiciary has yet to outline
successfully the parameters of a constitutional "case." In law, as in life,
the most fundamental questions often prove to be the most intractable.
Uncertainty about the demands of article III, however, is hardly
attributable to lack of attention. The case or controversy requirement
has been the focus of greater judicial energies in recent years than in any
corresponding period in our history. Reacting both to a burgeoning federal docket and to perceived dangers from the aggrandizement of judicial
power, the Supreme Court has attempted to pour content into article III
by constitutionalizing a variety of jurisdictional inquiries-the standing, 3
mootness, 4 ripeness, 5 and political question6 doctrines.
The lynchpin of these efforts is the demand for "distinct and palpat Cutler Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William
and Mary.
This Article was delivered at a faculty forum at the Northwestern University Law School in
May, 1985. Comments received have proven particularly helpful. Andrea Caruso and Evan Cox
provided valuable assistance.
1. The change has hardly gone unnoticed. The classic treatment is Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1290-91 (1976).
2. See generally R. COVER & 0. FlSS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979).
3. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-42 (1976) and Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (both cases holding that article III requires the injury, causation,
and redressability components of the standing doctrine).
4. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-20 (1974) (dismissing race discrimination
challenge as moot).
5. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60 & n.lO (1974) (holding the ripeness
requirement to be a component of the case or controversy standard).
6. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (four-justice plurality voted to
dismiss as a political question congressmeq's challenge to president's authority to revoke a treaty);
cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1972) (holding, inter alia, that the Court will not examine the
nature of Army surveillance programs absent a specific and objective injury or threat of injury). It is
arguable that a political question determination is merely a constitutional ruling on the merits. See
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
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ble" injury. 7 As the Court has noted, "whatever else the 'case or controversy' requirement embodie[s], its essence is a requirement of 'injury in
fact.' " 8 According to this standard, courts appropriately exercise their
power only to remedy harms that are distinct to the litigant and palpable
in nature. The recognition of abstract interests9 or the entertainment of
naked claims of the illegality of government action, unaccompanied by
concrete impairment of protected interests, 10 falls beyond the scope of
legitimate judicial review.
The individual harm standard, now employed by the justices for
over a decade, 11 is firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of article III.
The Court's dedication to the injury concept has seemed to solidify with
succeeding terms. 12 Though the implementation of this principle has
engendered a substantial body of criticism, 13 the injury standard has
recently enjoyed something of an intellectual resurgence. Academics 14
and noted jurists, including Justice Scalia, 15 have praised the requirement
as an essential tool in assuring an appropriately limited judicial role. The
future of the injury standard as the principal component of the case or
controversy requirement thus seems secure. This Article will attempt to
explore both the content and the complexity of the injury calculation. 16
In reviewing the Supreme Court's treatment of injury under article
III, commentators have tended to fall into two broad camps. Supporters
of a more rigorous injury standard, carrying forward a Bickellian tradi7. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
8. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974) (quoting
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)).
9. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-36 (1971) (Sierra Club lacked standing to
challenge proposed development because it failed to allege individualized injury).
10. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982) (no standing to challenge distn'bution of government largesse to
religious organization due to failure to identify personal injury suffered as a result of government's
action).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983).
13. See the articles cited in Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68, 68 n.3 (1984).
14. See Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights Are Violated:
Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work. 13 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 57, 114-17 (1985);
Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862, 869 (1985);
Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 69-70.
15. See Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element ofthe Separation ofPowers, 17
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 894-97 (1983); see also People Organized for Welfare & Employment
Rights v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 172-73 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699
F.2d 1166, 1177-79 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
16. The constitutional component of the standing requirement, as presently formulated,
demands not only the demonstration of injury, but proof of causation and judicial redressability as
well. See Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3325. This Article explores only the injury prong of the standing
inquiry.
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tion, 17 have emphasized the institutional benefits resulting from tightened justiciability requirements. They argue that restricting access to
courts augments democratic accountability and conserves judicial
authority for its most essential tasks. 18 Critics of the Court's rulings, on
the other hand, have stressed not only that diminished reviewability of
government action reduces constitutional oversight, but also that the
nature of the Court's injury decisions are dramatically inconsistent. 19
Such disparate views of constitutional harm, these critics argue, reflect
the justices' views of the attractiveness of the underlying claims rather
than any objective measurement of injury. 20
At least implicitly, however, both positions embrace the fundamental premise of the Supreme Court's case or controversy rulings: that
"injury" is a straightforward, semi-intuitive determination capable of
providing an objective and independent basis for ascertaining federal
jurisdiction. Accepting this common ground, both sides have limited
their criticism to charges of misuse. Defenders of restrictive justiciability
standards typically object that the Court has erred by accepting injuries
that are too diffuse and too abstract.2 1 Advocates of eased judicial
access, myself included, have accused the justices of willfully manipulating the injury standard to fence out disfavored claims. 22
17. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (restrictive
justiciability standards are a necessary and vital element of judicial review).
18. See Floyd, supra note 14, at 869; Scalia, supra note 15, at 894-97.
19. See Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative
Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 863, 869-76 (1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 664 (1977).
20. See supra note 19. By attractiveness of the underlying claims, I mean the judicial desire to
reach (either to accept or to reject) the substantive merits of the challenge. See Nichol, Causation as
a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185, 206-13
(1981). The tendency of the justices to peek past the jurisdictional determination has long been
noted. An almost comical example of such "merits distortion" occurred in Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986). In Bender, the Court dismissed for lack of standing the
equal access challenge filed by a religious group desiring to meet in a public school during a
scheduled activity period. The majority ordering dismissal was composed of Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, and the frequent advocates of liberalized standing, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackrnun. Apparently desiring to rule that the establishment clause poses no hurdle to such equal
access claims, Justices Rehnquist, White, Burger, and Powell dissented. These four architects of the
Burger Court's tightened standing requirement argued for eased access here. See id. at 1336-39.
21. See Brown, Quis Custodier /psos Custodes?-The School Prayer Cases, 1963 SuP. CT. REv.
1, 15-31; Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 41, 46-47; Scalia, supra note 15, at
894-97.
22. See Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635,
653-55 (1985); Tushnet, supra note 19, at 663.
This Article represents something of a departure in my thought about the standing doctrine. I
have argued, on more than one occasion, that standing is not a separation of powers doctrine. See,
e.g., Nichol, supra, at 645 ("separation of powers analysis simply cannot be applied to current
standing doctrine requirements"); Nichol, supra note 13, at 98-101.
My arguments here concern the complexities of the injury determination. I conclude, in short,
that the injury calculus-to be made both overt and comprehensible-must include an examination
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In reality, the injury determination is considerably more subtle and
multifaceted than either these countercharges, or the Court's opinions,
might suggest. Rather than merely being an instinctive appraisal of the
magnitude of harm, the injury calculus carries two distinct inquiries
under its broad mantle. Injury analysis demands the exploration of not
only the directness or actuality of the litigant's claimed injury, but also
the judicial cognizability of the inter{!st alleged to be injured. Since modern judicial opinions have focused exclusively on the first of these two
questions, the present articulation of "injury in fact" is radically
incomplete.
The Court's cursory treatment of injury has not been without its
costs. Since what I will call cognizability analysis is not yet an overt
aspect of the article III determination, the judicial examination of the
actuality of asserted harms has suffered. The diverse rulings that make
up the Supreme Court's case or controversy jurisprudence cannot be
explained by simply asking whether the asserted injuries are real or concrete. That is hardly surprising, I shall argue, since the Court has burdened the actuality prong of the injury determination with a greater
analytical load than it can logically bear. The unstated interplay between
the actual injury requirement and cognizability analysis has rendered
unduly complex the task of deciding whether an injury, or threat of an
injury, is sufficiently real to support jurisdiction.
More significantly, this approach leaves lower federal courts without
guidance. Injury decisions necessarily incorporate a determination that
the~plaintiff's allegedly injured interests either are or are not judicially
cognizable. Since the Supreme Court has conducted this determination
sub rosa, however, trial judges have been left completely at sea in the
examination of which sorts of interests, if abrogated, sustain jurisdiction.
The Court's decisions do not inform the lower courts of the need for
cognizability analysis. Moreover, the decisions do not develop a body of
of the nature of judicially cognizable interests. If standing law is so altered, it will be necessary to
introduce or formalize separation of powers scrutiny under the injury umbrella. See infra text
accompanying notes 149-64. My examination of the injury concept, therefore, leads me to conclude
that a jurisprudence of constitutional harm should be developed. In the evolution of this
jurisprudence, the overt consideration of the appropriate allocation of judicial power should play a
substantial part.
Much of this Article, then, could be characterized as a recantation. Perhaps it is that. It does,
of course, remain true that the "standing doctrine" announced by the Court affords no avenue for
separation of powers scrutiny. As I have claimed, causation and redressability analysis are logically
distinct from separation of powers scrutiny. See infra note 176. According to the Court's present
treatment of the injury standard, injury is also distinct from separation of powers scrutiny. I make
the claim here, however, that injury analysis is not the straightforward inquiry suggested by the
Court's opinions. A reformulated injury determination, I conclude, should openly embrace
separation of powers concerns.
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law openly addressing the factors that shape judicial cognizability as a
guide to future decisionmaking.
Finally, by oversimplifying the injury determination, the Supreme
Court has managed to pretend that the individual harm standard is
something other than what it is-a vehicle through which judges implement their own perceptions of the proper scope of article III power.
Constitutional standing decisions reflect an ad hoc character that hardly
enhances institutional credibility. I argue, therefore, that the injury calculation should be a bifurcated one, exploring both the actuality of the
alleged harm and the cognizability of the underlying interest alleged to
have been harmed.
The following sections consider, in some depth, the nature of injury
analysis. Part I briefly examines the adoption and current designs of the ,
individual harm standard. Part II then turns to the complexity of the
injury calculus. I focus initially on the measurement of the reality or
actuality of the claimed harm. Next I consider the concept and role of
judicially cognizable interests in the injury finding. Part III suggests a
reformulation of the injury determination. Only by more directly incorporating cognizability analysis into the injury calculation can the Court
make the case or controversy standard both workable and comprehensible. Unfortunately, perhaps, such a reformulation requires the reintroduction of many of the legal interest, separation of powers, and
federalism issues that the Court sought to eliminate from the article III
determination by adopting the injury-in-fact standard.
I
THE INDIVIDUAL INJURY STANDARD

Article III's case or controversy requirement carries little definitive
content. Madison explained to the delegates of the Constitutional Convention that the reference limits judges' attention "to cases of a Judiciary
Nature." 23 But outlining the sorts of activities that are of a "Judiciary
Nature" is hardly a simple task. As the Eleventh Circuit recently admitted, "An all-purpose definition of justiciability has never been published
because of the 'notorious difficulty' of defining the concept."24
In Marbury v. Madison, 25 the touchstone in interpretation of the
judicial function, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the necessity for
judicial protection of vested or legal rights. His arguments for judicial
review were premised on the Court's duty to dec~de the rights of individ23. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787 at 430 (1966).
24. Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1085 n.34 (11th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984) (quoting Marshall, Justici'abi/ity, in OXFORD EssAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE: A COLLABORATIVE WORK 265, 269 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961)).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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uals. Marbury thus presaged the adoption of a private rights model of
judicial authority that analogizes constitutional review to the common
law system of adjudication. It is a judge's obligation to decide private
disputes. If, as part of that process, interpretation of the constitutionality
of statutes is required, so be it. The trigger of judicial power, however, is
the protection of private rights.
The modern jurisdictional implement of the private rights model
was the legal interest test. 26 Under its premises, a "case" was presented
if the actions of the defendant harmed a "legal interest" of the plaintiff.
Of course, the cases presenting the greatest potential for judicial overreaching have always been those that call into question the actions of
federal or state government. Extending the common law analogy, courts
treated government defendants as if they were private persons. Courts
recognized claims against a government official, therefore, only if the official's conduct would have given rise to a cause of action in property,
contract, or tort had the defendant been a private person. 27 Thus, judicial power could appropriately be employed only if the harm presented
was the sort that the common law system sought to remedy in disputes
between private parties.
As the system of constitutional oversight became more pervasive,
however, the analogy to common law adjudication became less satisfactory. Government owes substantial duties and obligations to its citizenry
that have no clear counterparts in the common law system. Supreme
Court decisions recognizing jurisdiction to challenge a malapportioned
legislature's dilution of individual voting strength,2 8 a school district's
program of public prayer,29 and the government's distribution of largesse
to religious schools30 could not fit easily into the confines of the legal
interest test.
Liberalized judicial review of administrative decisionmaking also led
to a fatal collision with the purely private rights model. Agencies
charged with regulation in the public interest, plaintiffs characterized as
"private Attorney Generals,'m and jurisdictional grants offering access
26. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. See generally J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 20-33
(1978).
28. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
31. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)
(Congress can confer statutory power on private individuals to litigate for the public interest); see
also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) ("[T]hese private litigants have
standing only as representatives of the public interest"). These cases, among others, expanded
review of administrative decisionmaking to litigants only indirectly affected by regulatory action.
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to persons "adversely affected" by agency action32 greatly expanded the
purview of judicial power. Finally, the hint of circularity 'in the legal
interest approach-we won't hear your case because it's not the kind of
thing we do-helped to cap the doctrine's demise.
As the Warren era came to a close, the Supreme Court scrapped the
legal interest test, and by implication, the purely private rights model in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp. 33 No
longer did a plaintiff need to demonstrate the abrogation of a legally protected interest. Rather, a litigant could challenge government action by
asserting "injury in fact." 34 The injury-in-fact standard thus substantially liberalized access to the federal courts.
The Court also made clear in Data Processing that injury was not
limited to economic harm. 35 That in itself was hardly a controversial
step. One assumes that even an unemployed vagabond would have
standing to challenge his deprivation of liberty through summary detention at the hands of the state. The Court expressly pointed, however, to
"'aesthetic,'" "'conservational,'" and "spiritual" 36 values as examples
of interests that, if harmed, would establish injury. In the years following Data Processing the Supreme Court acted on these suggestions and
gave cognizance to an assortment of environmental, 37 religious, 38 electoral, 39 egalitarian,40 and other nontraditional claims41 that the federal
courts would have rejected in earlier eras.
More significantly perhaps, a variety of the interests accepted as permissible bases for jurisdiction were intangible, subjective, and widely
shared. One's interest in the aesthetic state of her own front lawn is per32. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
33. 397 u.s. 150 (1970).
34. Id. at 152-53 & n.l (noting that "[t]he 'legal interest' test goes to the merits," and is
therefore "quite distinct from the problem of standing.").
35. Id. at 154.
36. Id. (quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)).
37. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (recognizing that harm to environmental
interests, if properly pled, can be the basis for standing).
38. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (permitting, without discussion of standing,
review of establishment clause challenge brought by citizen-taxpayers against federal construction
grants to religious universities).
39. See, e.g., Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action At The Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259 (1977) (legislative apportionment case); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified, 411
U.S. 922 (1973) (same).
40. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (allowing, without discussion of standing,
challenge to state school book lending program to private discriminatory schools as state
encouragement of segregation).
41. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972) (interest in
benefits of interracial association recognized in action based on 1968 Civil Rights Act).
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haps tangible, but concern for the future of an endangered species,42 in
any normal sense of the word, is surely not. Whether or not one is
harmed by the distribution of government resources to religious schools
depends, in some part, upon the subjective state of mind of the litigant.
Some people are outraged by such developments, others laud them, and
most, one guesses, could not care less. And the litigants' interests flowing from damage to a national forest, or the dilution of electoral strength
resulting from a malapportioned legislature-whatever else they may
be-are widely shared among the populace.
With such a record in place, it is not surprising that federal plaintiffs
began to present "cases" based upon other intangible and diffuse claims.
If shared and elusive injuries to the right to vote or the right to a pristine
environment could sustain jurisdiction, why not harm to a litigant's
desire for the separation of church and state or for a Congress that complies with the accounts clause43 or the incompatibility clause?44 Wouldbe reformer plaintiffs claimed "injury" from the papal mass on Boston
Common,45 the White House nativity scene, 46 the printing of Christmas
stamps, 47 the government endorsement of segregation,48 the government
adoption of a year of the female without embracing a male counterpart,49
and other nontraditional claims. 50 During the same period, the federal
courts accepted a variety of claims based on express statutory grants of
standing, even though the interests supporting jurisdiction in such cases
were decidedly intangible and rooted in law, not fact. 51
42. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (recognizing standing under the
Endangered Species Act to challenge alleged threat to the snail darter).
43. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (standing denied).
44. Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (standing denied).
45. Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442 (D.C. Mass. 1979); see also Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973) (action seeking removal of monolith
with etching of ten commandments from public property); O'Hair v. Paine, 432 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (challenge to religious activities conducted by astronauts of
Apollo 8 and Apollo 11).
46. Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
47. Protestants and Other Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Watson, 407
F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
48. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
49. Men's Ass'n for Liberty and Equality v. United States, 79 F.R.D. 144 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
50. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982) (members of
nonprofit organization posing as would-be renters to detect racial steering practices by private
landlords granted "tester standing" to complain of violations of federal fair housing statutes); see
generally, LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework for
Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013.
51. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.l5 (1978) (challenging
administrative decisionmaking in deciding to dam a river under the Endangered Species Act). Before
the existence of the Endangered Species Act, a court probably would have dismissed such a suit
based on the threatened extinction of the snail darter for lack of injury in fact. The enactment of the
statute, however, "creates" an interest in the snail darter's plight that can support jurisdiction. That
interest, obviously, is legally based. The injury-in-fact standard of Association of Data Processing
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The Burger Court responded to what it apparently perceived as a
barrage of constitutional grievances by substantially tightening the Data
Processing test. No longer is injury alone sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Rather, the injury standard demands harm that is "distinct and
palpable."52 "Distinct" suggests that the challenged government action
must affect the plaintiff in a different manner than the rest of the populace. "Palpable," on the other hand, seems to require that the litigant's
harm be tangible or concrete. The Burger Court indicated that prudence, if not article III itself, further cautions against recognizing mere
"generalized grievances" where the litigant's asserted injury is shared by
the populace at large. 53
On the basis of this toughened standard, the Court denied the existence of a constitutional "case" in actions such as Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 54 United States v. Richardson, 55 Warth v.
Seldin, 56 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 51 and Allen v. Wright. 58 In elevating the
distinct and palpable harm requirement to constitutional status, the Burger Court fashioned one of its major jurisprudential legacies. Federal
courts exercise the "judicial power" only to remedy harms that are distinctly suffered by the litigant and palpable in character. The cognition
of other sorts of interests or the assertion of naked illegality unaccompanied by concrete harm falls beyond the scope of judicial power.
The Court's goals in focusing on individual harm are both ascertainable and, in perspective, laudable. The very language of article III suggests that there must be some line of demarcation between the
presentation of "cases" and the mere airing of political disagreements.
The tool adopted to provide this demarcation, personal injury, was
thought to carry particular advantage. Most pointedly, the Court
intended the injury standard to insnlate the case or controversy determination from the sway of the claim on the merits. In Data Processing, the
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) assumes, however, that injuries can be determined without
reference to Jaw. The economic, spiritual, and aesthetic harms discussed in that opinion are, in this
sense, "factual," not "legal." See id. at 154-55.
52. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
53. /d. at 499-500; see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1979).
54. 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (challenging Congressmen's membership in Armed Forces Reserve as
violating incompatibility clause of the Constitution, article I, § 6, cl. 2).
55. 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (challenging Congress's failure to require detailed account of CIA
expenditures under the accounts clause of the Constitution, article I, § 9, cl. 17).
56. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (challenging city's zoning ordinance as discriminating against persons
of low and moderate income).
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (challenging Congress's conveyance of property to religious college as
violation of the first amendment's establishment clause).
58. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (challenge to IRS guidelines for denying tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools).
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Court emphasized that the "'legal interest test' goes to the merits." 59
Article III's standing requirement, the Court insisted, is "different." 60
The terminology employed-injury "in fact" rather than "in law,"
layperson's 61 injury rather than lawyer's injury-suggests the Court's
desire to convert the case or controversy hurdle to a straightforward and
objective measurement uninfluenced by the attractiveness of the cause of
action or the political predilections of the decisionmaker.
To this end, the Supreme Court has ruled that the article III determination is to be made without regard to the substantive issues litigated
and "in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention." 62
The demands of the standard do not "diminish as the 'importance' of the
claim ... increases." 63 Nor does the standard countenance a "hierarchy
of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale,' " 64 allowing
easier access for some actions than for others. The Court thus designed
the injury standard largely to cure the perceived defects of the legal interest test. By employing a test of simple harm, the justices could free the
system of constitutional review from ill-fitting common law forms.
Injury in fact, it was also hoped, could be ascertained without "premature legal value judgments" 65 about either the merits of the claim or the
role of the judiciary in our system of government. The following sections
make the argument that the injury standard, as employed by the federal
courts, cannot attain these desirable goals.
II
EXPLORING INJURY

The initial difficulty in applying the distinct and palpable injury
standard lies in determining what it means to be injured. The answer is
not as obvious as it may seem. While Nietzsche apparently thought that
nothing he survived did him harm, 66 Donne believed that injury to any of
us affects us all. 67 The measurement of article III injury may be less
philosophical in tone and less intertwined with the question "What does
59. 397 u.s. 150, 153 (1970).
60. /d.
61. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 111.
62. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
63. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
64. /d.
65. Burnham, supra note 14, at 111.
66. "Maxim No. 8. From the military school of life.- What does not kill me makes me
stronger." F. NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE ANTICHRIST 23 (1968).
67. "'No man is an Iland, intire ofitselfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the
maine; if a Ood bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse ... ; any man's death diminishes me
... .'" J. Donne, Devotions XVII (quoted in Sierra Oub v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 n.2 (1972)
(Blackmun, J. dissenting)).
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it mean to be human?" than the statements of Nietzsche or Donne suggest. It is complicated nonetheless.
The most obvious aspect of the injury calculus focuses on the reality
of the litigant's claim of harm. Plaintiffs seek access to the federal courts
on the basis of asserted injuries to interests that are important to them.
The law of article Ill, if it is to be a limitation on the power of courts at
all, cannot allow a court merely to accept the litigant's subjective claim
that his injury is actual. The court must ask whether the litigant's injury
can reasonably be regarded as true or real." A court could well reject, for
example, a plaintiff's assertion that the mere existence of the FBI intimidates his exercise of free expression. If the court concludes that a reasonable person would not be intimidated, it has a basis for finding the
plaintiff's assertion of harm too unlikely to qualify for judicial redress.
The injury standard thus provides an essential judicial screen through
which a plaintiff's subjective claim that his interest has been injured must
pass. It is to this aspect of injury analysis that I now turn.
A.

The Actuality of the Harm

Judicial measurement of the reality of an injury can take a number
of forms. Perhaps the most obvious is represented by a case like Poe v.
Ullman. 68 There, the litigants sought to attack a Cotm.ecticut statute
that made the use of contraceptives illegal. The statute, however, had
apparently gone unenforced for decades. The Court thus ruled that no
justiciable case was presented, since the litigants could claim no actual
harm. 69 It may well be that the Court in Poe gave too little credence to
the inhibitions that flow from a statute's presence, even a moribund statute's presence, on the books. But the case illustrates the sort of inquiry
entailed in determining whether a plaintiff's claimed injury is real. There
was no doubt that the liberty to choose to use contraceptives was the sort
of interest to which, if diminished, the justices would pay attention. 70 But
the majority apparently had doubts about whether the plaintiffs' liberty
had, in any meaningful way, been infringed.
Other cases have turned on the narrower ground that, though the
source of harm is capable of injuring someone, it has not injured the
particular plaintiff before the court. It may be, for example, that Professor Broslawsky, who was denied standing to challenge a California criminal syndicalism statute in Younger v. Harris, 11 failed this aspect of injury
68. 367 u.s. 497 (1961).
69. Id. at 507-08.
70. The Poe ruling suggests, at the least, that had the plaintiffs actually been threatened with
prosecution for the use of contraceptives, the case would have been justiciable. !d. at 507; see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (sustaining challenge to same statute).
71. 401 u.s. 37 (1971).
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analysis. PlaintiffBroslawsky, a history instructor at Los Angeles Valley
College, claimed that as a result of the prosecution of Harris under the
statute, he was "uncertain as to whether he could teach about the doctrine of Karl Marx ... as part of his classwork."72 Given that the language and tenor of the statute were apparently concerned with
conspiracies, it may be that the Court refused to believe that the professor was actually inhibited in his classroom performance. Lower federal
courts have similarly refused to deem a plaintiff injured as a result of his
own strained reading of a statute. 73 An injury is not real if the litigant is
merely making it up.
On the other hand, examination of injury to the particular plaintiff
before the court can be pressed too far. An aside in Laird v. Tatum 74
reveals the risk of overzealous judicial scrutiny of the reality of the
claimed harm. There, the Court dismissed a challenge to the domestic
operations of an Army intelligence gathering system for want of a concrete injury. 75 The Court seemed to suggest that even if reasonable persons might have been chilled in the exercise of first amendment rights by
the program of Army surveillance, these plaintiffs were not chilled, and
therefore could have no "personal stake" in the litigation. 76 That, of
course, moves the inquiry beyond the objective, back into the subjective
realm, arguably raising the specter of judicial exploration into individual
suitor's motives. 77 But the thrust of inquiry-the reality of the asserted
harm-provides a necessary component of the injury determination.
Finally, actuality of harm demands that the injury asserted occur to
the plaintiff, as opposed to someone else. As an obvious example, imagine a challenge filed by a parent on behalf of children who are being
forced to pray in school. Discovery, however, reveals that the plaintiff's
children have long since graduated from the school in question. The
injury standard would thus require dismissal. There may well be
"injury" inflicted at the school in question, but it is not the plaintiff's
injury. This is essentially the teaching of cases like Ellis v. Dyson, 78 which
72. /d. at 39-40.
73. See, e.g., J.N.S., Inc. v. Indiana, 712 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff sought declaratory
judgment that state RICO provisions violated first amendment; complaint dismissed because plaintiff
had never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution).
74. 408 u.s. 1 (1972).
75. /d. at 13-16.
76. /d. at 13 n.7. Counsel for plaintiffs admitted at oral argument that his clients were not
" 'cowed and chilled.' " /d.
77. If the Court in Laird had ruled that a reasonable litigant would have been chilled by the
Army's spying program, but that these plaintiffs, because of their hardy natures, were not, and as a
result lacked standing, the ruling would have opened an unfortunate door. Imagine, for example,
the parameters of a trial on the comparative psychological profiles of various litigants. The Court's
actual holding, however, turned on the absence of a reasonable threat of injury. /d. at 15.
78. 421 u.s. 426 (1975).
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involved a challenge to a Dallas loitering ordinance. The Court noted
that if it were determined on remand that the petitioners "no longer frequent[ed]" the Dallas area, there was no credible threat of prosecution,
and the case would have to be dismissed for lack of actual injury. 79 The
harm that forms the basis of federal jurisdiction must belong to the
plaintiff.
The benefits of an actual injury requirement are numerous. As the
Supreme Court has long indicated, real harm ensures "personal stake" 80
in the outcome of the dispute and thus a minimum of litigant incentive.
The Court has thought this incentive to be instrumental to the proper
functioning of the judicial process. 81 Perhaps more importantly, actual
injury demands that the plaintiff demonstrate the concrete effects of the
challenged government action. Examination of these effects serves to fine
tune the judicial decisionmaking process since abstract rulings based on
hypothetical impacts are more apt to be unwise ones. The demand for
proof of actual harm also helps to assure the judicial nature of the litigation process. The application of legal principle to factual occurrence is a
distinctive aspect of the exercise of ·~udicial power."
Finally, the actual harm standard fosters self-determination. On
one level, it operates as something of a best-plaintiff rule. The victim of a
restrictive zoning scheme, for example, may be better able to inform the
decisionmaker of the harshness of the regulation than could the speculations of a libertarian advocacy organization. More fundamentally, however, the requirement of the injury's concreteness, when combined with
standing law's charge that the asserted injury belong to the party, works
to ensure that those most directly affected by the defendant's challenged
policy control the litigation.
The Supreme Court's two most recent standing decisions demonstrate the injury standard's preference for the specific victim of regulation. In Diamond v. Charles, 82 the justices dismissed for want of
jurisdiction an appeal seeking to sustain parts of an Illinois abortion statute. The suit began as a challenge to the statute filed by several doctors
who performed abortions in Illinois. Diamond, a pediatrician opposed to
abortion, was allowed at trial to join the state as a party defendant. Mter
the district and circuit courts upheld the bulk of the plaintiffs' claims, the
state chose not to appeal. Diamond, however, asserting his interest in
conscientious objection to abortion and his status as a losing defendant,
sought to continue the unwilling state's defense of the legislation. Finding the requisite case or controversy lacking, the Court ruled that even
79. /d. at 434.
80. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
81. /d.
82. 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986).

1928

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1915

though the doctor may well have possessed a strong interest in the
enforcement of the statute, the right to defend its criminal statutes on
appeal belongs to the state83-not to mere " 'concerned bystanders' who
will use it simply as a 'vehicle for the vindication of value interests.' " 84
In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 85 the Court reached
a similar result. There, a school board member who was sued for prospective relief in his official capacity was not allowed to " 'step into the
shoes of the Board' " and, contrary to its wishes, "invoke its right to
appeal." 86 Again, the Court barred a party defendant from challenging
an adverse judgment because the harm asserted as a basis for jurisdiction
was not his harm. 87 In the process, the Court accorded appropriate
respect to the school board's decision not to contest the ruling below.
These various applications of the injury-in-fact test rotate on a central axis: Does the plaintiff assert an actual injury to a personal interest?
Although the Court has used different doctrinal headings to categorize
the analysis, 88 the nature of the examination has been relatively consistent and overt. The Supreme Court has also recognized the present reality of threatened future harm and shaped its jurisdictional principles to
allow preenforcement judicial access, 89 with a few exceptions. 90 The cau83. Id. at 1704.
84. Id. at 1703 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
85. 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
86. Id. at 1333.
87. The principle of Diamond and Bender would seem to cast doubt on the standing of at least
some of the congressional plaintiffs in the pocket-veto case presently before the Supreme Court. See
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 106 S. Ct.
1258 (1986) (As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court dismissed Barnes as moot. 55
U.S.L.W. 4103 (Jan. 14, 1987)). Over a lengthy and vehement dissent by Judge Bork, the D.C.
Circuit granted standing to 33 members of the House of Representatives, the House Bipartisan
Leadership Group, and the U.S. Senate, to challenge the validity of an intersession pocket veto. 759
F.2d at 25-26. If Diamond and Bender employ the standing principle to assure that the decision to
sue is reserved for the centrally affected entity, individual members should not be able to present the
interests of the House and the Senate. In Barnes, the circuit court relied on its holding in Kennedy
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that a senator had standing to challenge a veto. 759
F.2d at 25-26. The future of Kennedy does not look bright. Nor should it be. One way to guarantee
that actions filed by members of Congress are not merely the grievances of legislators who have
failed to win their colleagues' support is to require that such suits be brought "officially" by one or
both Houses. Such a theory, of course, would not deny standing to the U.S. Senate in Barnes.
88. The Court has used the standing and ripeness doctrines interchangeably to measure the
"reality" of harm. See generally Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. (1987)
(forthcoming).
89. For decisions allowing preenforcement review of governmental action under a ripeness
analysis, based upon the present burdens of pending acts, see, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 200-02 (1983); Regional Rail Reorg.
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143-45 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1974); and Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972).
90. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-57 (1974) (refusing challenge to
banking regulatory scheme despite possible present harm to first amendment interests from the
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sation and redressability requirements, which round out the standing calculation, can be seen as a part of the same analysis. Causation assures
that the plaintiff's injury has actually resulted from the actions of the
defendant. 91 The redressability hurdle demands that a favorable ruling
will actually alleviate the asserted harm. 92 Both prongs have suffered
from dramatically inconsistent application. 93 But by design they assure
an acceptable nexus between the injury that provides the basis for jurisdiction and the caus~ of action asserted.
B.

Judicially Cognizable Interests

There is far more to the injury calculus, however, than measuring
the reality, or concreteness, of the harm or threat of harm. The Supreme
Court has typically focused the injury inquiry solely on the directness or
the tangible nature of the party's loss. But it is an oversimplification to
characterize a litigant as either simply injured or not. We are rarely
harmed in our totality. Perhaps only if I am killed am I "completely"
injured. Even then, from some religious perspectives, we think that
something remains. We sustain injuries, rather, in different capacities,
based on some interest we pursue as humans. ,Or at least the injuries are
most comprehensible to third parties on the basis of capacities harmed.
The most obvious example, perhaps, is bodily injury. My physical capacity has been diminished by the actions of the defendant. But we may
also, of course, suffer injuries to a variety of other interests.
A litigant tnay be economically harmed or injured to some extent in
the expanse of his liberties. No longer, for example, will I bring home as
much money per week or be able to tnove about town as I wish. These
economic and mobility losses may trigger other harms. My diminished
paycheck may make it difficult to provide for my wife and family-thus
implicating my interest as husband and father. Or my hampered right to
travel may force me to forego attendance at religious services, abrogating
my interest in the free exercise of religion.
The question "Are you injured?" folds within itself two inquiries. Is
operation of the statute); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507-08 (1961); United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 87-90 (1947) (refusing challenge to Hatch Act by public employees not yet
suffering enforcement action, despite present chill on political activity).
91. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 193-97 and cases cited therein.
92. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-05 (1975); see also Nichol, supra note 20, at 198201; Nichol, supra note 22, at 656.
93. I have extensively criticized the Court's application of the causation and redressability
standards. See Nichol, supra note 20; Nichol, supra note 13; Nichol, supra note 22. The severe
manipulation of the standards perhaps says a great deal about Supreme Court decisionmaking. It
does not, however, prove the broader point-that the inquiries have no appropriate place in the
standing determination. Without causation analysis, the jurisdictional inquiry would be mere
formalism, having no relation to the claim on the merits. Similarly, a redressability requirement is,
at some level, essential to avoid gratuitous decisionmaking.
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the interest asserted actually injured? And, is the interest asserted, if
injured, one of which the court will take cognizance? The second question is often more subtle, less straightforward, than the first. Nevertheless, it too makes up an essential component of the injury determination.
Under its aegis, the injury standard seeks to ferret out those interests that
are sufficient to support the exercise of judicial power.
To consider the interplay, and the dichotomy, between the two
inquiries, recall Warth v. Seldin. 94 There, a number of different plaintiffs
sought to challenge an allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinance enacted
by Penfield, New York. The bulk of the litigants were dismissed pursuant to a determination that the defendants had not actually caused the
injuries asserted. 95 If the would-be Penfield residents had indeed been
unable to locate housing, the Court reasoned, other factors-economic,
social, etc.-had likely caused the wrong. 96 The Court left no doubt,
however, that had the litigants actually been precluded from obtaining housing, that interest was one to which the judiciary would give
cognizance. 97
Metro-Act, an organization including Penfield residents, was also
among the plaintiffs in Warth. Since these residents already lived in the
community, they obviously did not suffer personal exclusion. Rather,
Metro-Act attacked the ordinance's rigorous demands as destructive of
their interests in "the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community."98 The Court did not reach the issue of the causal
link between the ordinance and this injury. The justices ruled rather that
harm to one's interest in interracial association, even if proven, does not
constitute injury in fact absent a specific statutory grant of standing. 99
The interest in living in an integrated community, alleged to provide the
foundation for the injury claim, was held not to be ·~udicially
cognizable." 100
94. 422 u.s. 490 (1975).
95. ld. at 502-04.
96. Id. at 504-07.
97. Id. at 507-08. Because the Court has not explicitly recognized cognizability as a distinct
issue, however, the operation of this essential component must be teased out of opinions, which
speak only of the injury's actuality.
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id. at 513-14. The Court distinguished Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972) which, unlike Warth, was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Supreme Court
found that distinction to be compelling since "[c]ongress may create a statutory right ... the alleged
deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no
judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute." Id. at 514.
100. ld. The Court did not explain why the benefit "of living in a racially and ethnically
integrated community" is not a judicially cognizable interest in the absence of a statutory grant of
standing. But the decision can only be read as holding that such an interest is not cognizable. Warth
is, in fact, one of the rare cases that uses the term "cognizable," though the concept is neither
developed nor employed as a distinct aspect of injury analysis. Despite its lack of development, I
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The nonresident plaintiffs in Warth failed the first aspect of injury
analysis. They could not convince the Court that the defendant had
actually harmed their interest in living in Penfield. The residents, represented by Metro-Act, apparently failed the second. Even if Penfield had
acted to diminish the litigants' pursuit of racial diversity, deprivation of
such an ethereal interest, at least in this context, 101 could not sustain
federal jurisdiction.
Determining what sorts of interests are judicially cognizable is a
slippery and amorphous process. Without acknowledging that it is making cognizability determinations, the Court has embraced a multitude of
interests: interest in economic advantage, interest in family development,
interest in the use of the environment or the plight of an endangered
species, interest in the full power of the vote, interest in not being forced
to disclose religious contributions, interest in not being forced to go to
public schools. The list is literally endless. 102
But what of other interests? What of my longing for a perfect separation of church and state, or for a government that refuses to impose the
cruel and irreversible penalty of death? Or, to move in a different direction, what of my interest in impeding the integration process-an interest
in racial purity? Or an interest in the economic prosperity of my business
as an international drug smuggler? Or in remaining in the country,
undetected, as an illegal alien? Why are some of these interests appropriate foundations for injury, while others are not? The question, often the
most fundamental of the injury determination, cannot be answered by
simply responding that the injury is actual or not, distinct and palpable
argue that the cognizability inquiry is a necessary component of the injury determination. It is
unfortunate that the scope and demand for the examination can only be gleaned indirectly from the
language of the Court's opinions.
101. The Court in Trafficante and Havens Realty allowed standing based upon similar injuries
pursuant to the 1968 Civil Rights Act. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10; Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-78 (1982). Of course, whether the interracial association claim involves
a "distinct and palpable" injury does not depend on whether suit is brought under the 1968 Civil
Rights Act or the equal protection clause. What apparently does change-though again the Court
has failed to say so explicitly-is the cognizability of the asserted injury. It may well be, in light of
the analysis of cognizability decisions I will present, see infra text accompanying notes 104-17, that
Warth was wrong on the cognizability of Metro-Act's claim. Once Congress has afforded
recognition to the "interracial association" interest in one context, perhaps it should be given judicial
recognition across the board. See discussion of statutory standing infra at pp. 1946-47; see also
Nichol, supra note 13, at 90-92 (if Congress passes legislation in which it intends to create a legally
enforceable interest, it has effectively announced a public value to be recognized by the courts).
102. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (economic
advantage); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (plight of endangered species);
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (full power of the vote); see, e.g., U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944) (reviewing solicitation practices of religious group); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
rehearing denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982) (action based on interference with solicitation activities of
religious group); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring children to attend
only public schools).
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or not. Injury analysis demands as well an answer to the question
"Injury to what?"
Consider an example. Suppose that the Federal Housing Authority,
in a fit of concern over residential crime, required that all new houses
receiving FHA loans use dead bolt locks on all entrances. Suppose then
that five different plaintiffs challenge the legality of the regulation in federal court. Each claims, on the merits, that the FHA has violated its
constitutive statutes. Plaintiff One is a builder of FHA funded homes.
She complains of the increased costs necessitated by the rule and fears
that she will be unable to recoup the new expenditures from her customers. Plaintiff Two is the maker of an advanced secure form of door lock,
which does not employ a dead bolt. He argues that his lock business will
be hurt unreasonably by the regulation. Plaintiff Three is an aesthetic,
utopian. He dreams of a world free of locks, walls, and possessions. The
new FHA rule, he claims, hinders the development of the world he
would bring to pass. Plaintiff Four is a burglar. The loss he alleges is
straightforward and economic. Plaintiff Five is the head of a public
interest group that lobbies on behalf of the poor. He claims not only that
the regulation is illegal, but that if the FHA devoted less energy to supervising building constrnction, it could make more loans available to the
poor. Because the regulation undermines the goals of his group, he
asserts harm to his efforts as a lobbyist.
The first two plaintiffs are, of course, traditional and Hohfeldian. 103
Plaintiff One, the builder, is not only economically harmed, but directly
regulated by the provision. Her standing claim would likely satisfy not
only the injury standard, but also its predecessor, the legal interest test.
Plaintiff Two, the lock maker, suffers a similar sort of harm to a different
business. His relationship to the rule, however, is indirect. His harm is
collateral to the regulation's operation. Although he might have trouble
mounting a challenge under the legal interest test, he clearly can demonstrate injury in fact, which would be characterized as distinct and
tangible.
Plaintiff Three's case is more interesting, and more difficult. The
interest he asserts, the desire for a property-less utopia, is comprehensible
to us. Yet somehow it is not shared by us. It is not so much that the
interest is not real to the plaintiff, but that it has not been embraced and
accepted by society. It has not been, to use Professor Vining's words,
capped as a public value. 104 Or, to put it another way, the interest
103. See Hohfe1d, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
L.J. 16 (1913).
104. J. VINING, supra note 27, at 171 ("[I]n the very recognition of a 'person' who is 'harmed'
courts formally cap the formulation of a value ... , confirm it in our language and our thought, and
permit a full and continuous search for its realization to begin.").
YALE
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asserted is not a judicially cognizable one. It may be important, in some
time or place, but it is not the sort of interest which the jurisdiction of the
federal courts will be employed to protect.
This, no doubt, sounds all too mystical. Recall, however, the
Supreme Court's determination in Roe v. Wade 105 that a married couple,
who had been warned by physicians against both childbirth and the use
of contraceptives, was not harmed by Texas's restrictive abortion sta:tute.
The couple claimed an infringement of their "marital happiness." 106 If
we assume that the couple was using "marital happiness" as a euphemism for their sexual freedom and intimacy, which was hampered by the
unavailability of abortion should pregnancy result, then the Court effectively ruled that such a harm could not sustain jurisdiction. 107 Implicitly, at least, protecting one's sexual freedom was not regarded as a
judicially cognizable interest.
To view this issue from another perspective, imagine a lawsuit challenging the clear cutting of timber in a national forest filed by John Muir
toward the close of the last century. Muir would claim loss to himself in
his use and enjoyment of the forest, and loss to the public for generations
to come in the destruction of the wilderness. Muir would likely have
been ejected from the courthouse as an officious intermeddler. Why then
were the litigants in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Proceedings (SCRAP) 108 treated in so much friendlier terms?
Because we had, in the intervening years, come to accept concern for the
environment as a true public value. The judiciary's recognition of this
interest became acceptable, even necessary, as a result of the shared
nature of the concern. 109 No longer was the desire for a pristine environ105. 410 u.s. 113, 128 (1973).
106. /d.
107. /d. Again, the language of the Court's opinion in Roe turns to actuality rather than
cognizability analysis. The litigants were tagged not harmed or subject only to a contingent
sequence of possibilities. There is no reason apparent from the opinion to assume that the couple's
sexual freedom and intimacy were not harmed. Nor was the harm unreal or contingent. The couple
did not need actually to experience pregnancy and take the child to term in order to suffer an injury
to their sexual intimacy; the prospect was sufficiently real to deter them before it happened. Though
disguised in actuality language, therefore, the ruling appears to be that this form of "marital
happiness" is not a judicially cognizable interest. That, of course, makes the case difficult to square
with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), declaring the importance and sanctity of the
right to marital privacy.
108. 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (student association had standing to challenge regulatory order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, based on allegations of injury to their use and enjoyment of the
environment and natural resources).
109. It can be argued that the notion of "capping" an interest is not as complicated as I make it
here. Perhaps, the argument would go, the difference between the SCRAP plaintiffs and John Muir
is the recognition of environmental interests by the U.S. Congress in the interim through various
pieces of federal legislation. Thus the judiciary should only recognize interests that have received
legislative imprimatur.
I have no doubt that the process of recognizing interests should take substantial account of
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ment relegated to the hinterland of individual pipe-dreams and preferences, like the wish for a property-less utopia. It had become part of us.
Much of the enterprise of measuring constitutional injury, therefore, is
judicial scrutiny of the nature of the interest that the litigant claims has
been harmed. Only if the interest is comprehensible to the Court, nonidiosyncratic, and sufficiently accepted by society at large to be considered
judicially cognizable can its diminution sustain jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Four presents a different, but related problem. No one
doubts that the burglar would be excluded from the federal courts. But
why? It is certainly not his inability to show plausible economic injury.
It is rather that the injury asserted implicates an interest to which the
courts will not give credence. Judicial capital will not be expended, at
least not knowingly, to foster lawlessness. This dynamic may have been
at least part of the motivation for the Court's restrictive jurisdictional
decisions in O'Shea v. Littleton, 110 Rizzo v. Goode, 111 and City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons. 112 In order to sustain the various claims for injunctive
reformation of the police and criminal justice practices challenged in
those cases, the majority of the Court considered it essential to determine
whether the litigants labored under a reasonable threat of repeated
wrongdoing at the hands of the state. The litigants would be injured
again by the defendants, the Court reasoned, only if they violated the
law, and thus again came into contact with police officials. 113 That likelilegislative action. See supra note 101. But the process cannot be so easily explained. First, it
proceeds from a massive common law foundation-recognizing economic, liberty, and aesthetic
interests as the everyday business of the federal courts-which was created largely by judges.
Second, since cases like Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971) do not involve express statutory
grants of standing, any process of capping must result from a screening of legislatively recognized
values, which allows the Court substantial1eeway. Third, legislative capping alone fails to explain
some cornerstones of article III jurisprudence such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1967)
(voters have standing to challenge legislative apportionment on grounds of vote dilution) and
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (HOME organization granted standing
based on impairment of counselling services provided to low income persons seeking housing).
Fourth, even if we were to assume that interests are cognizable only if rooted in positive Jaw
(contrary to the injury-in-fact rubric), the toughest article III problems would remain. The case or
controversy requirement shows the greatest strain in public actions based directly on the
Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58. Assuming that the Constitution is positive
law, the entire universe of constitutional interests would be cognizable under a capping scheme that
depended entirely on positive Jaw. Yet a variety of such claims have been deemed to lack judicial
cognizability. Cognizability analysis demands an overt process of inclusion and exclusion in which
judges must play a major role.
110. 414 u.s. 488 (1974).
111. 423 u.s. 362 (1976).
112. 461 u.s. 95 (1983).
Of course federalism interests also motivated the dismissals in O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons. See
Nichol, supra note 13, at 98-101.
113. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06 ("Lyons would have ... to allege that he would have another
encounter with the police"); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-73 (risk of injury to plaintiffs from inadequate
police disciplinary procedures seen as "too conjectural"); O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 ("here the
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hood was one to which the justices were hesitant to give cognizance. 114
The theory that seems, in part, to motivate the dismissal of claims in
cases such as Rizzo and Lyons is thus more resolute than that which
disposed of the dreamer, Plaintiff Three, in the hypothetical above. Not
only have the litigants' interests been presented in a context that has
failed to garner societal acceptance, they have been positively rejected as
shared values.l1 5
The fifth and final hypothetical plaintiff alleged injury to his ability
to lobby successfully for concerns more directly related to the poor as a
result of the FHA deadbolt rule. The gist of his claim of harm is that he
would prefer for the FHA to allocate its resources in another fashion.
The Supreme Court would almost certainly not consider Plaintiff Five to
have been actually injured. Any injury "suffered" may be too diffuse to
locate or describe. The heart of any determination to deny standing to
the lobbyist, however, would be that, although injured, he has not
asserted a judicially cognizable interest. The plaintiff has pleaded only a
public policy preference-like a wish that the government would put
more money into Aid to Families with Dependent Children or build a
lighthouse off the coast at Nags Head. Any injury sustained, if frustration of a public policy preference can be called that, should be addressed
to the legislature or the executive rather than the courts. Perhaps this is
the bottom line of the Burger Court's "generalized grievance" decisions. 116 If so, a more open and accurate methodology is required. 117
The injury standard demands not only that the alleged harm be real, but
that the interest asserted be one recognizable by the Courts.
prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and
charged with violations of the criminal law").
114. The Second Circuit's decision in Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554
(2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) is perhaps more directly illustrative. There, an
alien who had entered the United States illegally was denied standing to challenge State Department
regulations concerning the allocation of permanent immigration visas. Although the litigant had a
clear stake in the outcome of the dispute, the circuit court thought that giving credence to his claim
would encourage illegal entry. Id. at 557.
115. Rejection of values can occur through means other than the criminal law. Imagine a
lawsuit filed by a wealthy plaintiff seeking to challenge the system of federal student loans. As his
injured interest, he lists his desire to allow his children to grow up and be educated in an aristocratic
world, unsullied by the "democracy" of publicly funded education. Or posit a challenge to the
increasing ease, in most states, of voter registration. Is the interest in being part of a more limited
and exclusive voting pool judicially cognizable? We would not expect, for that matter, a federal
court to give cognizance to a Klansman's interests injured by statutes requiring him to sit beside a
black man on a public bus. Some value-based interests, though widely accepted at one phase of our
history, have clearly been rejected over the course of time. Courts would be perfectly justified in
ruling that these plaintiffs lacked standing under the cognizability prong of analysis I propose.
116. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 121-37.
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The Supreme Court has ignored this duality of the injury determination. Rather than analyze the interest proffered as a basis for jurisdiction
in terms of its shared acceptance as a public value, or as a judicially
cognizable interest, the Court has routinely dismissed asserted harms as
"abstract," "hypothetical," "indirect," "speculative," or "generalized"
complaints about the way government operates. The Court uses each of
these terms to connote that the plaintiff has not actually been injured for
purposes of article III. It is clearly true, however, that injuries to some
interests, though real, will not sustain jurisdiction. Article III injury
analysis thus incorporates, even if unstated or cloaked in actuality terms,
a decisionmaking process whereby the judicial cognizability of the
asserted claim is measured.
If the injury determination is appropriately segregated into consideration of the actuality of the claimed harm and cognizability of the interest, much of the Court's article III jurisprudence takes on a different
cast. Consider, for example, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War, 118 United States v. Richardson, 119 and Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 120 cases
in which plaintiffs asserted their interests as citizens in seeing the Constitution obeyed. The line distinguishing personal injury from general
political disagreement drawn in these cases is thought to set the outer
boundaries of judicial power.
It is not meaningful to say that these cases turned on the belief that
the interests asserted by the litigants were not actually injured. The
interests of the Schlesinger plaintiffs in compliance with the incompatability clause were at least argnably transgressed by the service of
Congressmen in the Armed Forces. 121 The Richardson plaintiffs' "right"
to public disclosure of the CIA budget, as seemingly demanded by the
accounts clause, was clearly denied by the defendant. 122 And the separationist plaintiffs in Valley Forge surely alleged, and could have proven,
harm to their interests in the appropriate relations between church and
state. 123 If anyone has an interest in compliance with these clauses, there
118. 418 u.s. 208 (1974).
119. 418 u.s. 166 (1974).
120. 454 u.s. 464 (1982).
121. 418 U.S. at 210-14.
122. 418 U.S. at 167-70.
123. 454 U.S. at 468-70. It is not true, as a general matter, that the Court has considered the
establishment clause to be beyond judicial cognizance. The school prayer cases arc obvious
examples of personalized harm to non-establishment values. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479 (1985) (one-minute period of silence violated establishment clause). The Court has balked,
rather, at recognizing the intangible harm that results when one's government gives money to
religious groups contrary to one's wishes. Valley Forge is an example. 454 U.S. at 477-78. Yet the
Court has entertained such claims when they arise from congressional expenditure, see Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), or local government action, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
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is no reason these plaintiffs were not among the injured.
The Court must have reasoned rather, that the interests to which the
plaintiffs alleged injury were not, at least in these instances, appropriate
to support jurisdiction. I have argued that the Court ascertains which
sorts of interests will support federal jurisdiction by a complicated process of inclusion and exclusion, whereby interests or values are deemed
sufficiently shared or public to be judicially cognizable. But if that is so,
how can the interests reflected in the accounts, incompatability, and
establishment clauses, which are so fundamental that they were written
into our constitutional charter, fail the test of judicial cognizability? It
would seem that enshrinement in the text of the Constitution would be
the foremost possible proof of public acceptance. The answer is that in
determining standing, the Court considers not only which injuries are
actual and which are capped, but it also examines which interests are
appropriately vindicated by the judiciary. 124
The line that the Burger Court has attempted to navigate between
distinct and palpable injuries and merely intangible claims becomes more
perplexing, then, since it cannot be explained by reference to actual
injury terms or as lacking shared societal values. The underlying premise
of the body of the Court's article III jurisprudence is that the injury standard constitutes an objective, autonomous, and overarchlng barrier to
the exercise of judicial power. By adhering to its demands, the argument
goes, judges avoid considering the attractiveness of the claim on the merits or the perceived importance of the substantive cause of action in: the
article III inquiry. But only by oversimplifying the injury determination
has the Court managed to keep the inquiry intact. A major step in the
inquiry is apparently, if not actually, shunned, since the Court's analysis
is more than an examination of how direct, tangible, or speculative is the
alleged harm. In order to complete the determination, the Court must
explore the judicial cognizability of the interest allegedly diminished.
That process implicates both the shared nature and judicial acceptability
of the underlying interest-whether the Court chooses explicitly to consider those issues or not.
Even if one accepts the Court's silence as an acceptable way to make
decisions, the results in the cases confound. It cannot actually be that
the Court's rulings tum on the distinction between the concrete and the
intangible nature of the harm. Decisions granting standing based upon
intangible injuries abound. 125 Nor does the key lie in the supposedly
(nativity scene in public display). The distinction, apparently, is that "abstract" violations of
separation by the executive branch of the federal government are not cognizable-a difficult
principle to discover in the text of the Constitution.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 149-64.
125. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (standing to challenge municipality's
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"distinct" manner in which the challenged conduct burdens the plaintiff.
Both statutory and constitutional cases, based upon diffuse and widely
shared harms, populate the agenda of the federal courts. 126 Not even the
line, if there is one to be drawn, between naked assertions of illegality and
objective injuries caused by illegal means provides the compass. There
are many examples of judicially accepted claims in which the plaintiff's
only interest was in seeing the defendant comply with the Constitution,
without any other personal benefit. 127
Current application of the standing doctrine has also seriously
eroded Marbury's implicit claim that constitutional review could be sustained only to protect private rights. Federalism cases like National
League of Cities v. Usery 128 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach 129 are not
maintence of creche); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 727, 737-40 (1984) (harm to right to equal
treatment recognized even though court's remedial options limited to removing unequal benefit from
class that excluded plaintiff); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) ("tester" with
no intention of renting has right to truthful information about availability of rental housing);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state support of discrimination); Gordon v. Lance, 403
U.S. 1 (1971) (vote dilution); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (allowing
challenge to school prayer from which children could be excused).
126. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.15 (1978) (Court relied
on Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982), which grants standing to "any
person"); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 686 (1973) (recognizing harm to aesthetic and environmental interests as basis for standing);
F1ast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (standing to challenge congressional expenditures for
religious schools); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (standing to challenge congressional
reapportionment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-07 (1962) (same).
127. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3235 (1985) (permitting challenge to use of
state and federal funds to pay salaries of public employees who teach in parochial schools); Heckler,
465 U.S. at 737-40; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,280 n.l4 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (allowing challenge to medical school's affirmative action program despite
Bakke's inability to show he would have been admitted absent the program; Court allowed challenge
because the University's decision was "not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 plnees");
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-65 (1973) (allowing challenge to state distribution of
textbooks to racially discriminatory private schools); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972); Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (taxpayer standing granted to challenge federal aid to
parochial schools); Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363.
In the establishment clause cases, the Court has invalidated a number of government programs
that require public supervision of the sectarian beneficiaries of state largesse. See, e.g., Aguilar, 105
S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional the provision
of certain instructional materials and equipment to sectarian schools). The supervision, according to
the Court, constitutes an impermissible entanglement of church and state. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (state supervision of nonpublic school accounting procedures is unconstitutional).
In none of these deeisions, however, has the Court demanded that the program be challenged by a
member of the class "victimized" by religious organization. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 685 (minority
religious status not required of litigant challenging municipal Christmas creche). The programs
have been successfully attacked, rather, by litigants who are unhappy that the government benefits
are being used to foster religion. The challenges are based on bare assertions of illegality,
unaccompanied by consequential harms.
128. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (declaring application of Fair Labor Standards Act to certain local
government employees unconstitutional).
129. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (challenge to 1965 Voting Rights Act).
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based on private interests at all. They are overt disputes lodged by one
governmental unit against another as a means of vying for power. The
Burger Court's separation of powers cases, Buckley v. Valeo, 130 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 131 and now Bowsher v.
Synar, 132 have added a substantial twist. Litigants relying on private injuries-deportation, reduced pensions, etc.-have been allowed, on the
merits, to present arguments over the appropriate separation of powers.
In Chadha, for example, the plaintiff won because the powers of the President had been usurped. 133 The pensioners who challenged the GrammRudman provision in Bowsher prevailed, not because the government
could not reduce their pensions, but because the process employed to
reduce the payments trammeled executive prerogative. 134 Since the suits
were not third-party standing cases, ultimately each plaintiff could claim
only the right to a decisionmaking process that reflects an appropriate
separation of powers. The claims increasingly parallel arguments that
the frame of government is askew, 135-a jurisdictional base repeatedly
rejected in the taxpayer and citizen standing cases.
The Court's article III jurisprudence, then, is distressingly incomplete. No standard, or even method of inquiry, is set forth to determine
the judicial cognizability of asserted interests. None of the labels even
partially explain the outcomes of many cases. It is easy to conclude that
the more one looks at the case or controversy rulings, the less one finds.
III
LIMITING JUDICIAL POWER

As was common with much ofthe Warren Court's jurisprudence, its
jurisdictional decisions moved primarily in one direction: liberalized
access. While the Warren Court removed traditional barriers to the exercise of judicial power, it left the task of erecting the proper new boundaries for constitutional courts to its successor. The Burger Court's effort
to limit judicial authority, therefore, is understandable. Fearing that a
marked expansion of judicial authority would result from the acceptance
of a variety of nontraditional suits, the Court attempted to give substantive content to the article III case or controversy requirement. The chief
product of this effort has been the distinct and palpable injury
standard. 136
130. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (challenge to regulation of campaign contributions).
131. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (resident alien has standing to challenge the constitutionality of
congressional veto of executive suspension of deportation).
132. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (declaring Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional).
133. 462 U.S. at 947-958.
134. 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
135. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 33-58 (discussion of evolution).
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The injury requirement, however, as presently defined by the Court
is a poor tool with which to limit judicial power meaningfully. As Part
II demonstrates, the Court's opinions have largely evaded the full complexity and depth of the injury determination. Instead, the justices often
tum to a language of private rights and obligations that belongs to an
earlier day. The modem judicial agenda is hardly limited to cases of
concrete injury to private rights. The injury standard thus plows a field
that is badly eroded. It is small wonder that the Court has found the
going difficult.
The recent embrace of the distinct and palpable harm standard by
jurists and commentators does not help to resolve these complexities.
Professor Floyd, for example, has characterized the Burger Court's treatment of the injury standard as "healthy" and "more consistent with the
limited role" of judicial power. 137 He sees the cases as excluding plaintiffs who assert "no legitimate claim," no "arguable claim oflegal right,"
and no "personal injury." 138 I am not sure that the cases stack up that
way. 139 But even if they did, the injury decisions provide little guidance
in the determination of what is a "legitimate," "legal," or "personal"
interest.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, has argued that the "law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against the imposition of the
majority." 140 The public action cases like Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hil/ 141 or F/ast v. Cohen, 142 however, are difficult to square with that
characterization. From the opposite perspective, it is possible to see the
rejection of jurisdiction in cases like Valley Forge as refusals to enforce
minority religious rights against the majority.
Scalia argues as well that strict standing requirements foster separation of powers since such requirements render many issues unreviewable. 143 If refusing to review cases assures separation of powers,
137. Floyd, supra note 14, at 869.
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 118·27.
140. Scalia, supra note 15, at 894.
141. 437 u.s. 153 (1978).
142. 392 u.s. 83 (1968).
143. Scalia, supra note 15, at 892-97. Justice Scalia's vision of the standing doctrine is, of
course, considerably more subtle than the "less is better" characterization suggests. He argues that a
tight standing doctine serves separation of powers goals both as an aspect of judicial function and as
a means of excluding issues from the judicial purview. He apparently would have decided F/ast the
other way and stresses that the standing doctrine serves to exclude issues as well as plaintiffs: If "the
determination of whether a particular federal expenditure constitutes an establishment of religion
cannot be made the business of the courts at the instance of a federal taxpayer, it is difficult to
imagine who else could possibly bring it there." ld. at 892. For me, however, the mere fact that the
establishment clause's enforcement is left to the legislature does not create an appropriate separation
of powers. It may be that our scheme of separated powers relies on the judiciary to assure
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however, the ideal solution would be for the Court to forego judicial
review entirely. Separation of powers demands that the judiciary fulfill
its function. The ''less is inherently better" model addresses only half of
the separation of powers equation.
As the Supreme Court's injury analysis presently stands, the distinct
and palpable harm standard may actually increase rather than diminish
judicial power. In cases presenting fundamental questions of judicial
supervision, the justices typically do little more than label the cause as
acceptable or not. Judge Bork has approvingly characterized the standing inquiry as guided by an "idea" of the constitutional limits on the
powers of the judiciary that is "more than an intuition but less than a
rigorous and explicit theory." 144 But if judges can decide which cases are
to be heard on the basis of a bolstered "intuition" rather than obedience
to principle, they exercise more power, not less.
Nor, on the other hand, are the arguments for eliminating injury
analysis persuasive, though they at least recognize the present embrace of
the public litigation model. Professor Tushnet has suggested that standing analysis be abandoned in favor of a "barebones" approach pursuant
to which the deciding court would seek to guarantee only an adequate
record and adversary presentation of the issues. 145 Professor Albert, recognizing the strong tie between the Burger Court's justiciability analysis
and actionability, would collapse the standing determination into the
decision on the merits. 146
These formulations overlook standing law's function at the threshold stage of litigation. The doctrine has at least served courts comprehensibly in exploring whether the litigant's harm is actual. Demanding
that a plaintiff's claimed injury be real and his own is a desirable component of both standing analysis and article III. More importantly, jurisdictional decisionmaking entails a preliminary determination that the
compliance with the establishment prohibition. It is difficult to see the challenges presented in Flast
and Valley Forge as posing snbstantial dangers that the Court will interfere with appropriate
legislative or bureaucratic prerogative.
Of course, Justice Scalia's view of Flast reflects a broader theory that would grant standing only
to truly "concrete" and "particularized" injuries that set the litigant "apart from the citizenry at
large." Id. at 882, 895. That theory, as he at least partially recognizes, would demand a major
dismantling of case or controversy jurisprudence. See, e.g., the litany of cases described supra at
notes 125-33 that fail to meet the distinct and palpable harm standard. Moreover, Justice Scalia
would apparently declare unconstitutional broad statutory grants of standing based upon shared or
generalized rights. Id. at 894-97. That pushes the separation of powers notion in an unusual
direction because the vague contours of the case or controversy requirement are used to thwart the
will of the United States Congress.
144. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
145. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Bri/mayer, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1698, 1706 (1980).
146. Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL
L. REv. 1139, 1143-60 (1977).
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plaintiff's interest is one that should be judicially recognized. In the
hypothetical described above, Tushnet and Albert would, I assume, grant
standing to the burglar, utopian, and lobbyist. The law of article Ill is,
no doubt, troubling. That does not mean that it is useless.
Professor Doemberg would grant access in the public constitutional
cases since they represent violations of the Lockean theory of social contract. 147 Even if that is true, however, the universe of Lockean violations
is not necessarily coextensive with that of American judicial power. In
Doemberg's sense, every allegation of illegality, statutory as well as constitutional, could be said to threaten the social compact. Every claimed
transgression is potentially ultra vires. Yet a judiciary that reviews every
claim of government illegality may truly threaten the separation of
powers.
The heart of the problem is that, because of the Court's conclusory
treatment of the injury requirement, we know little about why some public actions are entertained and others avoided. We do know, however,
that distinct aud palpable harm is not the distinguishing characteristic.
Nor do the cases explain what is. 148
The answer, if indeed there is one, lies in the concept of judicially
cognizable interests. Litigants can offer, uo doubt, an endless array of
essentially public claims. It is hardly difficult to imagine citizen suits
brought to challenge the Nixon pardon, the naming of an ambassador to
the Vatican, the processes by which congressional salaries are determined, the refusal of the President to depict an accurate state of the
Union, the payment of government obligations during budget crises from
the Social Security Trust Fund, the origination of revenue bills in the
Senate rather than the House, the use of religious symbols in the
Supreme Court building, or any other asserted government illegality.
147. Doernberg, "We the People'~· John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to
Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52 (1985). Perhaps a more accurate representation
of standing law is reflected in Burnham, supra note 14. Professor Burnham, following the work of
Joseph Vining, recognizes many of the complexities of the injury determination. Accordingly, he
characterizes the injury calculus as a common law process of adjudication, turning on the "public"
nature of the values being asserted as the basis for jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, this leads Burnham to conclude that cases like Richardson and Schlesinger are
appropriately based on the justices' lack of " 'sympathy with and understanding of the loss[es1'
occasioned by the allegedly unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 96 (quoting J. VINING, supra note 27,
at 177). As I have explained, supra at text accompanying notes 121-23, given the constitutional
pedigree of the interests asserted in Richardson and Schlesinger, a judicial determination that the
interests are not cognizable because they are insufficiently "capped" is clearly illegitimate. Perhaps
the interests lacked cognizability as the result of deference due to other branches of government.
They are, however, undoubtedly "capped" public values in the Vining/Burnham sense.
148. Evidently there is a line that separates Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728
(1984), and Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) from Valley Forge, Schlesinger, Richardson,
and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

THE DISINTEGRATION OF ARTICLE III

1986]

1943

Even beyond this, it is possible to envision plaintiffs asserting public policy preferences in challenges to legislative and executive decisionmaking.
If all such claims were judicially cognizable, the lines between the legislative, executive, and judicial functions, now fuzzy, would b~ lost completely. But it is also true that the Supreme Court has, time and time
again, deemed it necessary to the judicial function to entertain essentially
public claims.
It is helpful, therefore, in exploring judicially cognizable interests to
address openly the factors-in terms of the appropriate judicial rolethat separate the wheat from the chaff. Cognizability analysis, as the
hypothetical discussed above demonstrates, must incorporate a substantial evaluation of the public acceptance of the interest in question. Cognizable interests must have been "capped" as public values. Moreover,
in the "generalized grievance" actions challenging noncompliance with
the Constitution, cognizability analysis must focus on the propriety of
judicial recognition of the proffered claims. There are strong reasons
that the interest in voting strength recognized in Baker v. Carr 149 is one
appropriate for the courts. The role of the judiciary, especially as
explained by participational theorists like Dean Ely, includes the mandate to referee the political process and to unplug the channels of political change. 150 Flast v. Cohen, 151 Lynch v. Donnelly, 152 and Aguilar v.
Felton 153 might be seen in a similar light. If the first amendment was
designed to remove speech and religion concerns from the "vicissitudes
of political controversy," 154 much of the argument for judicial recognition of free expression and religious interests is successfully borne.
Finally, cases like Heckler v. Mathews, 155 Norwood v. Harrison, 156 and
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 157 even if based upon
intangible claims, implicate the majority's responsibility to govern impartially. As such, it would be appropriate, consistent with modern visions
of the judicial role, to grant access to these clahns.
It seems unlikely that similar arguments concerning the appropriateness of judicial cognizability could be made in many of the real and
hypothetical public actions listed above. The issues, however, are hardly
simple ones. Many of the structural provisions of the Constitution implicate the appropriate functioning of the democratic process, and thus
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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u.s. 186 (1962).

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY

AND DlSI'RUST 73-134 (1980).
392 u.s. 83 (1968).
465 u.s. 685 (1984).
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
465 u.s. 728 (1984).
413 u.s. 455 (1973).
438 u.s. 265 (1978).
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may be of particular import to the courts. It is certainly easy to see
Richardson as a candidate for judicial cognizability. One would guess
that the accounts clause was designed to promote democratic accountability, assuring that the electorate has sufficient information to cast its
franchise. There may be prudential reasons to avoid some such cases, 158
but the conclusion that the interest is not judicially cognizable under article III seems misplaced.
Yet the arena of public, generalized, intangible constitutional claims
is a troubling one for the courts under any calculus. If all such cases are
accepted, the judiciary embraces a dramatically larger segment of the
universe of government decisionmaking as its domain. If, on the other
hand, the courts eschew all generalized claims, they ignore both their
own handiwork and the powerful and beneficial role that public law
plays in our present jurisprudence. It might be best to assume, therefore,
that generalized constitutional claims are not the appropriate subject of
judicial recognition unless they trigger a special need for intervention.
Concern for the limited role of the judiciary in our system of government
might justify such a presumption against jurisdiction.
Perhaps in accordance with that presumption, then, cases like
Schlesinger and Ex parte Levitt 159 could be seen as correct in result, if
not in theory. Those cases implicated no interest expressly reserved to
the citizenry. Nor did the practices challenged render the democratic
process substantially askew. Challenges to the procedures by which revenue bills originate, congressional salaries are determined or ex-presidents
are pardoned could, for similar reasons, be treated to a similar fate.
Under this line of reasoning, the congressional standing cases 160 should
perhaps also be rejected for lack of a judicially cognizable interest. Members of Congress asserting the interests of the Senate or the House of
158. I have pointed to some such prudential barriers in previous essays. See, e.g., Nichol,
Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REV. 798, 846-47
(1983).
159. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (interest of a citizen and member of the bar is insufficient
to challenge appointment and confirmation of a U.S. Supreme Court justice).
Certainly Schlesinger is a difficult case. The incompatability clause is a structural provision of
the Constitution which implicates the functioning of the democratic process. To the extent that the
clause is designed to assure that legislators representing citizens are not unduly influenced by the
executive branch, Schlesinger becomes similar to the reapportionment cases. The incompatability
clause, however, is primarily a separation of powers provision designed to prohibit the intermingling
of the executive and legislative branches. If that is the case, Schlesinger implicated no strong interest
reserved to the citizenry. Richardson, on the other hand, presented stronger arguments for judicial
cognizability. The "sunshine" provided by the accounts clause seems closely tied to democratic
decisionmaking. Of course, the main thrust of my argument in this Article is not that cases such as
Schlesinger and Richardson are either right or wrong. The Supreme Court should explain why
asserted interests are accepted or rejected rather than merely characterizing the injury as generalized
or hypothetical, and therefore insufficiently real.
160. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985).
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Representatives typically base their claims on alleged diminutions of governmental power. The pocket veto case recently before the Supreme
Court, 161 for example, implicated no personal interests. Rather, the litigants claimed harm to the "lawmaking power of the two houses of Congress."162 But if one governmental entity's claim that another has
limited its power is deemed a cognizable interest, it markedly augments
the scope of judicial authority. "Congressional" standing quickly
becomes "governmental standing," with analogous claims presented by
members of the executive and judicial branches, or by local officials protesting federal intrusion. 163 Nor does there appear to be any strong reason to afford judicial access. A determined Congress, in the usual course,
can protect its own interests. 164 The Court should not needlessly travel
such dangerous roads.
The line between judicial cognizability and legislative or executive
prerogative is not an easily constructed one. It is, however, a constructed
one. No outside, objective, and nonmanipulable standard determines the
demarcation. When measured alone, directness of injury, concreteness of
injury, and substantiality of injury all miss the mark. Analyzing those
interests that support jurisdiction completes the calculus. Any true
examination of the judicial cognizability of interests must also consider
the function of the judiciary to produce acceptable results.
Difficult as the process may be, substantial benefits will result from
incorporating cognizability into the injury determination. Cognizability
analysis, of course, does take place now. It is merely sub rosa. One result
of this process is that the actuality side of the injury determination is
rendered less comprehensible. Standing doctrine claims to limit judicial
attention to litigation based on distinct and palpable injuries. A look at
the cases, however, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the distinct
161. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21,26 (1985), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 106 S. Ct.
1258 (1986), dismissed as moot, 55 U.S.L.W. 4103 (Jan. 14, 1987).
162. Id.
163. This, of course, has already transpired, ironically at the hands of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (association of municipalities and states
challenged constitutionality of Fair Labor Standards Act amendments of 1974); see also Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (states challenged constitutionality of Voting Rights Act amendments
of 1970).
164. In the pocket veto case, for example, Congress could have reenacted the statute in
question. See Barnes, 159 F.2d at 69 (Bork, J. dissenting). One can envision, however,
circumstances in which the legislative and executive branches might reach a true impasse. In a
dispute over the war power, for example, a determined Congress might well take a series of actions
to express its dissatisfaction with executive adventurism. If Congress passed a resolution under the
War Powers Act and authorized its leaders to challenge the legality of the military action, the
"necessity" for judicial intervention would be increased. It hardly makes sense to force Congress to
endanger the lives of troops by reducing funding or to move to impeach the President in order to
resolve the constitutional crisis. Only in the event of such an impasse, however, should
congressional standing be recognized.
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and palpable injury standard is inconsistently applied. 165 Separating
cognizability analysis from measuring the actuality of the injury claim
may help to save some content for the latter.
More importantly perhaps, under present standing guidelines inferior federal court judges are left completely without guidance on the
cognizability issue. The Supreme Court has given no hint of the underlying process that leads it to conclude that abrogations of one's interest in a
full powered vote, truthful information about rental housing, and a pristine environment are judicially cognizable, while similar intangible interests in being free from the stigma of government endorsement of
segregation or the full pursuit of "marital happiness" are not. Given this
record, it is difficult to understand what is expected of a federal district
judge when presented with an action based upon "injury" to an intangible interest not previously either accepted or rejected by the Supreme
Court. If cognizability analysis is overt, the federal courts will at least
begin to develop a jurisprudence to instruct future decisionmaking, creating and refining a language to give structure and precedential value to
cognizability concerns. The quality of judicial decisionmaking-measured in terms of consistency, honesty, and predictability-could only be
improved.
Of course, the goal most directly served by incorporating
coguizability analysis is judicial accountability. It is no small luxury for
the Court to be able to announce, without explanation, that it will hear
certain sorts of shared and intangible claims while the Constitution
demands that it reject others. A study of the standing decisions of the
past three decades indicates, at the least, that the Court will hear some
such cases. I have argued that, given the complex nature of the injury
determination, it is essential that some process of exclusion and inclusion
be employed. If it is employed overtly, the reasons for choosing to entertain certain sorts of cases while closing the judicial doors to others can be
weighed and criticized by the Court's constituents. The requirement that
courts explain their decisions checks the exercise of judicial power.
Finally, an additional collateral benefit of focusing on cognizability
would be the development of a more satisfactory explanation of the
Court's statutory standing cases. At present, the judicial approach is
hopelessly circular. The distinct and palpable injury standard is said to
apply to statutory standing claims. Yet harm to any interest created by
statute constitutes distinct and palpable injury. Thus, the Court labels a
variety of shared and intangible injuries distinct and palpable. A statutory interest, however, is easily seen as judicially cognizable. The process
of segregating those interests that are appropriate for judicial cognizance
165. See supra text accompanying notes 118-27.
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from those that are not may be difficult to encapsulate. But if Congress
has chosen to protect and foster a public value, a court's path should be
clear. Legislative enactment reflects shared acceptance of the interest
and typically alleviates any concern over separation of powers. Any
interest created by statute, therefore, is judicially cognizable. If the interest is harmed, article III injury exists.
There are drawbacks to making the cognizability of interests an
explicit aspect of article III decisionmaking. First, the scope of the
inquiry extends beyond the traditional borders of standing analysis. If a
court attempts to explain why harm to one's interest in a full powered
vote is injury while the harm to one's interest in the accurate portrayal of
the state of the Union is not, it must consider the appropriate role of the
judiciary in a multi-faceted governmental structure. Determining which
sorts of interests are judicially acceptable bases of action, therefore, necessarily involves also analyzing separation of powers and federalism
issues. Accordingly, the measurement of constitutional injury must
incorporate these complexities.
As one who has spent a good deal of energy claiming that the standing determination should be kept distinct from the demands of separation
of powers and federalism, 166 I find the fusion of these issues disconcerting. The relationship between article III injury and other separation of
powers concerns has been the most confusing and destructive aspect of
the modem case or controversy decisions. Nonetheless, consideration of
the complete parameters of the injury inquiry requires overt examination
of the appropriate role of the judiciary in our system of government.
Consideration of the judiciary's role does not mean, however, that
separation of powers and federalism analyses should merely skew the
standing decision-the methodology most often preferred by the
Supreme Court. The causation and redressability prongs of the article
III standing test-frequently manipulated in the cases to meet separation
of powers interests 167-reruain logically distinct from separation and federalism concerns. 168 The Court's conclusion in Allen v. Wright 169 that a
challenge to IRS enforcement procedures did not meet the causation
standard because of unspecified separation of powers worries makes little
166. See Nichol, supra note 22; Nichol, supra note 13. 1 have argued that the standing
guidelines announced by the Court-injury, causation, and redressability-<io not implicate
separation of powers issues. That, in substance, still seems to me to be the case. It is certainly true
that the causation and redressability hurdles are analytically distinct fron separation of powers
analysis. Nichol, supra note 22, at 646-50. But as I have tried to show here, the determination of
which interests, if harmed, are judicially cognizable is considerably more complex. In analyzing
which sorts of intangible interests trigger article III power, consideration of the appropriate powers
of other institutions of government does seem justified.
167. See Nichol, supra note 22, at 655-57.
168. See id. at 646-50.
169. 468 u.s. 737 (1984).
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sense. 170 Similarly, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 171 the Court's rigid
treatment of redressability_ in the name of federalism only makes the remedy requirement less comprehensible. 172
Nor should the Court use separation of powers as a conclusory
label-or more accurately as a bugaboo-as it has done in the past. Valley Forge, for example, literally reeks of worry over the appropriate separation of powers. 173 Such worry is not accompanied, however, by a hint
of the actual dangers such a suit would pose to legitimate bureaucratic
prerogative. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 174 has the same failings. The
Court speaks extensively of federalism sensitivity. 175 It fails to explain,
however, why the dangers posed by an injunction limiting police use of
deadly force are more debilitating than a bevy of other acceptable federal
restraints. 176 Such decisions reflect Justice Scalia's view that diminished
judicial review necessarily fosters separation of powers. 177 The Court
employs the concept only as a label, not unlike its frequent conclusions
that an injury is "intangible." The disappointed plaintiff is literally told
no more than: "We will not hear your case."
These concerns aside, however, making cognizability analysis an
explicit and distinct step in article III standing scrutiny will mandate the
marriage of separation of powers and federalism considerations to the
injury determination in some instances. The bulk of the cases presented
for consideration in the federal courts, of course, involve simple injury
issues. Plaintiffs seek money, restoration of reputation, liberty, freedom
from unfair competition, reinstatement to employment, or any of the
hundreds of interests long recognized by the judiciary. Still, plaintiffs
frequently assert intangible, legally based, and widely shared injuries in
federal tribunals. If the harm or threat of harm to the claimed interest is
actual, injury analysis demands that the allegations be scrutinized for
judicial cognizability. And cognizability is finally answerable only by
deciding which sorts of tasks are appropriate for federal courts.
That brings me to the second, and far more substantial, drawback to
incorporating cognizability into case or controversy jurisprudence. Recognizing! the complete character of the injury determination means that
the standard cannot perform the straightforward and laudable task that
170. Nichol, supra note 22, at 645-47.
171. 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (appellant, beneficiary of child support order, had no standing to
challenge discriminatory enforcement of criminal child support statute).
172. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 206·08.
173. The Court stated in Valley Forge that to recognize standing in the case would alter
"relationships between the co-equal arms of the National Government." 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
174. 461 u.s. 95 (1983).
175. Id. at 105-12.
176. See Nichol, supra note 13, at 99-101.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
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the Supreme Court has assigned to it. It has never been simple to ascertain what should trigger the federal judicial power. For nearly two centuries, federal courts found the existence of an article III case if either a
statute gave authority to sue or the common law recognized an analogous claim. The common law system became, not unreasonably, the
measure for the case determination. But the system of constitutional
review could not forever be limited to its common law origins. Therefore, the Supreme Court turned to the injury standard, hoping to bring
jurisdictional analysis into line with a rapidly developing system of constitutional oversight and to avoid the circularity and premature judgment
of the legal interest test.
The Court thought that the injury-in-fact standard could provide a
distinct trigger to federal jurisdiction, dependent neither on manipulable
legal standards nor judicial ideology. Of course, there would be close
cases, but as a general matter, litigants are either harmed at the hands of
the government or they are not. Perhaps if the Court had limited the
scope of article III injury to economic or physical harm, such hopes for
the standard might have been realized. But environmental and religious
claims brought injury to intangible and shared interests within the judicial purview. Statutory and constitutional actions based on injury to
interests such as interracial association and vote dilution were not only
abstract, but examples of injury rooted in law rather than in fact.
With such substantially broadened judicial horizons, talk of injury
alone is no longer meaningful. Injury does not exist in a vacuum. A
court may appropriately exercise its authority on the basis of an alleged
diminution of electoral strength. A judge may also refuse to entertain an
action based on a citizen's interest in the constitutional use of the pardon
power. But that is hardly because one is a distinct and palpable injury
and the other is not. Eventually, therefore, article III jurisprudence must
develop standards that openly address the distinctions between the
acceptable and the illegitimate. In the realm of common and abstract
values, analysis of the interest's coguizability becomes a complex venture.
It entails considering the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis other relevant government actors. These problems are not insurmountable. They do, however, prevent the injury standard from being realistically characterized as
an intuitive, factual determination independent of judicial perspective or
ideology.
The Court designed the injury standard as a free standing boundary
to the exercise of federal judicial power. That boundary, if it ever
existed, gradually disintegrated with the acceptance of intangible, shared,
and legally based interests. The article III standard that will be erected in
its stead must address considerably bolder issues. Jurisdictional determinations may well tum, for example, on the centrality of claims to the
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functioning of the democratic process or the necessity for ~onstitutional
supervision of particular government actions. That means, of course,
that the federal courts will decide to hear some sorts of cases because
they believe it appropriate for them to do so. No independent boundary
limits the federal judicial power. But then, it never has.

